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Mission Impossible 
The acronym METTS is familiar to military commanders the world over.  METTS 
consists of a problem solving approach to military scenarios under the following 
headings; Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, Space and time.  When applied to the 
situation facing US commanders in Iraq - as the June 30th deadline for transition to power 
expires - many challenges become apparent. 
 
In terms of mission, the situation is complex.  The military are favourably predisposed to 
simple mission statements that contain clearly articulated aims and objectives within a 
definite time-frame. The invasion phase of the war in Iraq was a classic example of such 
a clearly defined mission.  Simply stated, the mission consisted of a rapid armoured 
advance on Baghdad, the removal of Saddam’s regime and the destruction of his military 
infrastructure.  These were clearly identifiable deliverables that were quantifiable and 
reasonably predictable in terms of operational planning and logistical support. The 
resulting campaign was an American Blitzkrieg that secured all three objectives.  By 
April the 17th, D plus 30, Saddam’s statues were being toppled in central Baghdad. 
 
The occupation and nation-building phases of the war have proven far more complex.  
The first objective in this mission – to provide a secure environment with which to 
facilitate reconstruction projects, consensus building and democratic structures – has not 
been achieved.  Nor is there a clearly defined time frame for the achievement of a stable 
democracy.  There is no withdrawal date for US troops and no consensus between the 
White House and the Pentagon as to precisely how long American troops should stay in 
Iraq.  Such an open ended arrangement inevitably leads to what the military term 
‘mission creep’.  In the absence of a clear exit strategy, US troops on the ground in Iraq 
will become involved in an increasingly complex and hostile environment, characterised 
by increasing casualty rates and few concrete successes on the battlefield.   
 
In terms of command and control, as Iraqi insurgents seek to further destabilise the newly 
established fledgling state, it is not clear as to who has ultimate authority over coalition 
troops in Iraq.  Centcom has already had to defer to US Secretary for Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld’s so called ‘invasion-lite’ concept for the conduct of the war in Iraq.  After the 
June 30th deadline, Centcom will also have to deal with further political interference from 
the newly established Iraqi interim government.  In this uncertain environment, the only 
clear direction given to US commanders under the new UN resolution is to the effect that 
the force ‘shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the 
maintenance of security and stability in Iraq including by preventing and deterring 
terrorism’.  In other words, the US military must remain on a war footing whilst deployed 
within Iraq. 
 
In terms of the enemy, the threats to the newly established Iraqi democracy include both 
internal and external elements.  Internally, coalition forces have failed to destroy the 
many Shia, Kurdish and Sunni militia within the country.  Centcom’s original intention 
was to replace factional militias such as the Shia Badr Brigades, Dawa and Mehdi armies 
along with the Kurdish Peshmerga with inter-ethnic government controlled security 
forces.  The objective was to disrupt local paramilitary command structures and to break 
up mono-ethnic sectarian forces whose internecine rivalries threatened to plunge post-
invasion Iraq into civil war.  This objective has not been achieved.   
 
Indeed, in the north of the country, approximately 60,000 Kurdish Peshmerga have 
simply donned Iraqi Civil Defence Corps and Iraqi Police uniforms.  Their local 
commanders - along with their original designs for Kurdish autonomy and independence 
– remain more or less unchanged.  In the south of the country, the Shia Badr Brigades 
and Dawa army, under pressure from Ayatollah Ali Sistani have been tolerated by 
coalition forces and are becoming integrated into the security environment of the new 
Iraq. Even Moqtada al Sadr’s infamous Mehdi army has been allowed to remain in 
existence.  Major General Martin Dempsey of the US 1st Armoured Division has even 
suggested that up to 4,000 Mehdi army members might become the core element of the 
Iraqi Civil Defence Corps assigned with the security of the cities of Najaf and Kerbala.  
In Fallujah, many Shia leaders are dismayed at the creation by US forces of a 
predominantly Sunni security force consisting of many former members of Saddam’s 
former Republican Guard. 
 
The failure to disband these militias and to create a non-sectarian security alternative for 
Iraq may pose serious problems for Iraq both internally and externally.  In the short term, 
they may provide some limited security dividend, but in the longer term, they may well 
divide Iraq along armed sectarian lines. This might lead to the prospect of civil war.  
Such a civil war might also destabilise the region by embroiling Turkey and Iran in Iraq’s 
internal affairs. 
 
Turkey has already stated that it will not tolerate autonomy or independence for Iraq’s 
five million northern Kurds for fear that it would reawaken Kurdish nationalism among 
the ten million Kurds living in south eastern Turkey.  Turkey may well be prepared to 
intervene militarily in northern Iraq in order to prevent a repeat of its internal war 
between the Turkish government and Turkish Kurds which lasted from 1984 to 1999 at a 
cost of at least 37,000 lives.  With a modern, well equipped armed forces consisting of 
almost one million troops, Turkey would represent a considerable military threat to the 
sovereignty of the new Iraq.  This is especially so given recent warnings by Turkish 
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdrogan that he strenuously opposed Kurdish autonomy. 
 
Iran might also become involved in Iraq’s internal affairs.  There are strong ideological 
and religious links between the Shia communities in Iran and Iraq.  Many of the Badr 
Brigade, Dawa and Mehdi army commanders were trained in Iran by the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards. If the Shia community in Iraq does not achieve its ambitions 
under the current transition to democracy, its leaders might well seek military assistance 
from Iran. 
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